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FOREWORD
FIRST PRINCIPLES FOR VIRGINIA'S FIFTH CENTURY
The Honorable Robert F. McDonnell *
Because of Divine Providence, I am honored to serve as Attor-
ney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia as we celebrate the
400th anniversary of Virginia. It is an incredibly exciting time to
be Attorney General. Although I have only been in office for a few
months, I am pleased that we have made significant progress to-
ward protecting our children from sexually violent predators by
passing Virginia's version of Jessica's Law, through tough man-
datory sentencing and GPS tracking of all offenders,' strengthen-
ing the sex offender registry,2 and toughening the standards for
* Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia. B.A., University of Notre
Dame; M.A., Boston University; M.P.A., Regent University; J.D., Regent University.
1. Under the terms of Jessica's Law, criminal penalties now include: (1) a mandatory
sentence of twenty-five years to life for a first offense of rape, forcible sodomy and object
sexual penetration in the commission of an abduction, or serious bodily injury to a child
under the age of thirteen; and (2) mandatory life sentence for a second conviction. See Act
of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 853, 2006 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§
18.2-48, -61, -67.1, -67.2, -370.3, 19.2-303 (Cum. Supp. 2006)).
Jessica's Law also provides a criminal penalty of mandatory three years of supervised
probation as part of the sentence for offenders convicted of a serious sex offense with man-
datory GPS monitoring, unsupervised court probation for life, and the enactment of pro-
visions to prohibit sex offenders convicted of a Jessica's Law violation from working on
school, day care, or other child minding properties and living in close proximity to schools
and child day care centers (500 feet). Id.
2. Virginia law now has increased penalties for violations of the sex offender registry
(including mandatory GPS tracking for violators of the registry), increased re-registration
requirements for offenders convicted of registry violations, and improved procedures that
shorten the timeframes for jails and prisons to notify the Virginia State Police of release or
entry of a registered sex offender from their facilities. See Act of Apr. 19, 2006, ch. 857,
2006 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 2.2, 9.1, 16.1, 18.2,
19.2, 22.1, 23-2.2, 46.2, and 53.1 of the Virginia Code). The law also ensures that all regis-
tered sex offenders, not just those deemed sexually violent, will be on the public website.
Id. State law also requires additional mandatory information from offenders on the regis-
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civil commitment of sex offenders.3 Moreover, the continuing war
on terror, globalization, the Internet, as well as the nationaliza-
tion and, in some cases, internationalization of criminal gangs,
pose new public safety and legal issues that were unimaginable
even a generation ago. The challenges of prosecuting criminals,
preserving convictions on appeal, defending our laws from consti-
tutional attack, representing state government agencies, and pro-
tecting our consumers, our children, as well as our seniors, have
never been greater.4
Yet, as I confront the challenges of Virginia's Fifth Century, I
am well aware of a great responsibility-preserving the First
Principles of our constitutional system. As a successor to Edmund
Randolph, who served as both the first Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Virginia and the first Attorney General of the
United States, I have a responsibility to be a steward of those
principles, and the principles of the justice system. Randolph's
generation-which included Washington, Jefferson, Madison,
Marshall, Mason, and Henry-established a constitutional sys-
tem that secures the blessings of liberty while nourishing the free
market capitalism that has given us more choice and more pros-
perity than any people in human history. At times, it is tempting
to disregard these limits in order to find "an expedient solution to
try including mandatory work address, mandatory DNA sample, mandatory physical ad-
dress, and mandatory new photo every two years. Id.
The new law also requires annual spot checks and mandatory monitoring of sex offend-
ers on the registry and provides mechanisms to increase community awareness of sex of-
fender registry (mandatory school notification, parental information at start of school, and
mandatory child day care center notifications). Id.
3. Virginia is one of only sixteen states that allows for the Civil Commitment of
Sexually Violent Predators ("SVP"). Since the passage and funding of the SVP law, see VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -920 (Supp. 2006), Virginia has committed twenty-two individu-
als as SVPs.
Under the SVP law, there is an increase in the number and type of predicate sexual of-
fenses screened for possible civil commitment, including: (1) kidnapping with intent to de-
file or rape; (2) aggravated sexual battery of any victim regardless of age; (3) carnal
knowledge of a child; and, (4) attempts to commit rape, forcible sodomy, object sexual
penetration, and aggravated sexual battery. Id. § 37.2-900 (Supp. 2006).
The law also designates the Static-99 as the screening instrument to determine eligibil-
ity for assessment as a SVP, id. § 37.2-904(B)(1) (Supp. 2006), and allows for a number of
procedural changes to the SVP process including allowances for the Attorney General to
seek a continuance for good cause shown. Id. § 37.2-906 (Supp. 2006).
Finally, the law requires Department of Corrections to do a national criminal back-
ground check prior to application of the Static-99 on all eligible offenders. Id. § 37.2-
903(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2006).
4. To that end, I am pleased that the General Assembly has increased the resources
for my office as we endeavor to meet these challenges.
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the crisis of the day."5 The limits may seem outdated or too con-
straining for our twenty-first century world. Yet, the constitu-
tional system developed by that great generation of Virginians
"protects us from our own best intentions."6 There are several
overarching principles-the First Principles upon which the na-
tion was founded and upon which our prosperity rests-that we
must never forget.
First, "[i]n the compound republic of America, the power sur-
rendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct gov-
ernments."7 The Constitution establishes "two orders of govern-
ment, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sus-
tain it and are governed by it."' By dividing sovereignty between
the national government and the states,9 the Constitution en-
sured that: "a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself.""° Thus, the "preserva-
tion of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are
as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the
preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the national
5. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992).
6. Id.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classic 2003). As early as 1767, John Dickinson suggested that sovereignty should be di-
vided between the British Parliament and the Colonial Legislatures. See ALFRED H. KELLY
& WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
75-76 (3d ed. 1963).
8. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the thirteen states effectively were thir-
teen sovereign nations. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776) ("[T]hese
United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States."). Each indi-
vidual state retained the "full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, es-
tablish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of
right do." Id. Indeed, the Articles of Confederation explicitly recognized that each state
.retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.., which is not by this confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. II (U.S. 1777). In sum, before the ratification of the United States
Constitution, the states were sovereign entities. See Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 7, at 320; see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 7, at 176 ("Power being almost al-
ways the rival of power, the General Government will at all times stand ready to check the
usurpations of the State Governments, and these will have the same disposition towards
the General Government.").
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government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."11
This division of sovereignty between the states and the na-
tional government "is a defining feature of our Nation's constitu-
tional blueprint." 2 The division of power between dual sover-
eigns, the states and the national government, is reflected in the
founders brilliant enshrining of federalism in the Constitution's
text,'3 as well as its structure. 14 As the Supreme Court noted,
"U]ust as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accu-
mulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will re-
duce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front." 5
Because "the federal balance is too essential a part of our con-
stitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing free-
dom," 1" the Supreme Court of the United States has intervened to
maintain the sovereign prerogatives of both the states and the
national government. In order to preserve the sovereignty of the
national government, the Court has prevented the states from
imposing term limits on members of Congress 7 and instructing
members of Congress as to how to vote on certain issues.'" Simi-
larly, it has invalidated state laws that infringe on the right to
11. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
12. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002).
13. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
14. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X
("The Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."). As the Supreme
Court observed:
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this
limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as
we have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment
confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment
thus directs us to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sov-
ereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992). Moreover, the Tenth Amendment
is not the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism. See Printz, 521
U.S. at 924 n.13.
15. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 523 (2001).
16. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 800-01 (1995).
18. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-26 (2001).
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travel, 9 that undermine the nation's foreign policy,2 ° and that
exempt a state from generally applicable regulations of interstate
commerce. 2 Conversely, recognizing that "the States retain sub-
stantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, pow-
ers with which Congress does not readily interfere,"22 and that
"the erosion of state sovereignty is likely to occur a step at a
time,"23 the Supreme Court has declared that the national gov-
ernment may not compel the states to pass particular legisla-
tion,24 to require state officials to enforce federal law,25 to dictate
the location of the state capitol, 26 or to regulate purely local mat-
ters.27 Similarly, the Supreme Court has restricted Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 and its ability to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.29 Indeed, in some cir-
cumstances, the states' sovereignty interest will preclude federal
courts from enjoining on-going violations of federal law. 30
Second, after sovereignty is divided between the states and the
national government, "then the portion allotted to each subdi-
vided among distinct and separate departments."3' Moreover, the
"Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer
the laws enacted by Congress; the President, it says, 'shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' personally and
through officers whom he appoints."32 Thus, Congress may not in-
terfere with the President's enforcement of the law.33 Conversely,
the President may not interfere with Congress's ability to legis-
19. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498-507 (1999).
20. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-74 (2000).
21. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
22. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
23. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 533 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
25. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
26. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579 (1911).
27. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000); United States v. Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006) (hold-
ing that the United States Attorney General may not shift "authority from the States to
the Federal Government to define general standards of medical practice in every locality").
28. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
29. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
30. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1997).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 7, at 320.
32. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3).
33. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983).
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late.34 Of course, the judiciary, through the practice of judicial re-
view, ensures the national government remains one of enumer-
ated, hence limited, powers.35 Yet, even with judicial review,
there are limits. For example, the meaning of a statute turns on
"the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators."36 Similarly, the courts acknowledge that they are
not "omni-competent" and, thus, cannot micromanage govern-
ment departments.37
Third, in addition to these structural limits, both the Virginia
and national constitutions contain textual limits on the powers of
government.38 Many regard the Virginia Declaration of Rights
and the Federal Bill of Rights as creating limits on government.
Yet, like James Madison, I regard the Bill of Rights not as creat-
ing limits, but merely as confirming limits that already exist. In
other words, even if the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the
national Bill of Rights did not exist, the Virginia government and
the national government would be incapable of establishing a
church, punishing the free exercise of religions, abridging the
freedom of speech, confiscating fire arms, and so forth. 39 More-
over, various provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment restrict
34. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1998).
35. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,405 (1819).
36. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
37. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The
conceit that [courts are competent to decide every issue] belongs to a myth of the legal pro-
fession's omnicompetence that was exploded long ago.").
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. I-X; VA. CONST. art. I.
39. Many assert that the U.S. Constitution represents a delegation of power while the
state constitutions represent a limitation on power. The highest court of New York ob-
served:
The Federal Constitution is one of delegated powers and specified authority;
all powers not delegated to the United States or prohibited to the States are
reserved to the States or to the people. Great significance accordingly is prop-
erly attached to rights guaranteed and interests protected by express provi-
sion of the Federal Constitution. By contrast, because it is not required that
our State Constitution contain a complete declaration of all powers and au-
thority of the State, the references which do appear touch on subjects and
concerns with less attention to any hierarchy of values ....
Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 n.5 (N.Y. 1982) (citation omitted); see also
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 785 (Md. 1983).
While I agree that the national government has no authority that is not expressly dele-
gated in the Constitution, I disagree with the notion that a state government is limited
only by the state and federal constitutions. There are some objectives that no govern-
ment--or at least no government that is republican in form-can ever pursue regardless of
what the Constitution may or may not say.
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the states while empowering the national government to protect
civil liberties. Both the Equal Protection Clause and Privileges or
Immunities Clause impose substantive restrictions on the
states.4" Moreover, although the Bill of Rights originally did not
apply to the states,4' the Due Process Clause incorporates most of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights.42 Additionally, Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to enact
legislation that enforces the substantive guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment against the states.43 Consequently, if the
states have engaged in conduct that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, then Congress can take remedial action to correct
the violation and to prevent future violations.44
In sum, as I relish the privilege and confront the challenges of
being Attorney General at the dawn of Virginia's Fifth Century, I
will remember the First Principles-Dual Sovereignty, Separa-
tion of Powers, and Limited Government. Although I have a re-
sponsibility to fight crimes, protect consumers, defend our stat-
utes, and represent all agencies of the commonwealth, my
overarching responsibility is to the Virginia and national consti-
tutions.
40. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 n.1 (2005) (Equal Protection); Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-04 (1999) (Privileges or Immunities).
41. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
42. See 2 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 308-09 (4th ed.
2000) (listing cases and specific provisions of the Bill of Rights); cf. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS,
No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-4
(1986) (arguing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates all provisions of the
Bill of Rights).
43. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997).
44. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000). For example, because
"the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (citation omitted), one way of enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment is to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. If Congress is en-
forcing the Fourteenth Amendment, then it may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 726 (2003); Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S.
at 80; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsec-
ondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
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